T he most obvious group to be affected by a takeover offer is the shareholders of the target company. Fortunately a plethora of regulation exists to ensure fairness and equality of treatment of shareholders in such situations. Another group that is likely to be substantially affected is the employees of the target company who will be concerned that the successful bidder will engage in cost-saving measures and that jobs will be lost. Even if employees retain their jobs, they may be concerned that their jobs will not be secure or their conditions of employment altered. 
TAKEOVER BIDS
The general purpose of the draft directive is to co-ordinate certain safeguards which member states require of companies for the protection of shareholders during takeover bids. Article 5(1) sets out five general principles which must be respected in the rules introduced by member states to implement the directive.
One of these principles imposes a duty on the board of the target company 'to act in all the interests of the company, including employment'. The Company and Commercial Law Committee of the Law Society of Ireland have noted that this principle may cause difficulties where there is a conflict between the interests of the shareholders and the interests of the employees. Such a conflict would arise for example where a generous offer had been made to shareholders but in circumstances where the bidder made clear its intention to dismiss a large portion of the workforce following the acquisition. Modern corporate theory would appear to suggest that the claims of the shareholders should be paramount. Furthermore the committee point out that as the main focus of the draft directive is on protecting shareholders theirs would appear to be the overriding interest.
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Article 6 sets out the informational requirements to be complied with by member states in their rules. This article imposes obligations on member states to provide employees with certain relevant information. Article 6(1) states that as soon as the bid has been made public, the target's board must inform the representatives of its employees, or the employees themselves if there are no representatives. In addition art. 6(2) requires that, when the offer document has been made public, the board communicate it to the employees' representatives or, where there are no representatives, to the employees.
Article 6(3) sets out the minimum informational requirements to be included in the offer document. This document should contain inter alia details of the bidder's intentions with regard to o the future business and undertakings of the target, its employees and its management. The latest proposal requires that the document should also include any change in the conditions of employment. General principle no. 8 of the act states that when giving advice and furnishing information in relation to the offer the o directors of the target company shall be bound 'to consider the interests of the shareholders as a whole'. General principle no. 9 of the City Code upon which this principle is based, states that in giving advice to shareholders directors should 'consider the According to r. 24.1 of both the Irish Rules and the City Code, the bidder should include the following information in the offer document:
THE IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL ACT & RULES
its intentions regarding the continuation of the business of the target and its subsidiaries; its intentions regarding any major changes to be introduced in the business, including any redeployment of the fixed assets of the target and its subsidiaries; the long-term commercial justification of the offer; and its intentions with regard to the continued employment of the employees of the target and of its subsidiaries.
Clearly when an offer document has been published, the employees will have direct access to the information contained therein. It will not be important that this information was not passed to them directly by the directors as required by the directive but was obtained by the employees independently. For this reason, Alistair Defriez, the Director-General of the London Panel, has described the provision in the directive as a 'somewhat mystifying development'. It should also be noted that the informational requirements in r. 24 are not quite as farreaching as those stipulated in the directive. Article 6(3) involves notifying employees of 'any change in the conditions of employment'. Such information would not necessarily be substantial enough to come under the heading of 'any major changes to be introduced in the business' and may not therefore be included in the offer document. Similarly, unless the changes in working conditions are so severe as to constitute constructive 
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS
The introduction to the City Code states that: and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations', the directive, as introduced, only applies where there has been a transfer of an undertaking or part of an undertaking. It does not apply therefore where a limited company is taken over by the acquisition of its share capital. In such circumstances, the regulations which implement this directive into Irish law will be of no use to employees.
The collective redundancies directive
The Protection of Employment Act 1977 implements in Ireland the directive on the approximation of the laws of member states relating to collective redundancies (Directive 75/129, OJ 1975 L48/29). The act provides certain informational benefits to employees, where dismissals of a large proportion of the workforce in any period of 30 consecutive days are effected, for certain reasons stated in the act. A dismissal on the grounds of redundancy is included. The act stipulates that where an employer proposes to create collective redundancies it shall, with a view to reaching an agreement, consult with employees' representatives and supply them with all relevant information. This information should include the reasons for the proposed redundancies, the number of employees to be made redundant and the period during which it is proposed to effect the proposed redundancies. The consultations should include the possibility of avoiding the proposed redundancies, reducing the number to be made redundant or otherwise mitigating their o o consequences.
A number of problems render this legislation less than potent in safe-guarding employees' interests in a takeover such as:
insider dealing restrictions may prevent the communication of information to employees at an early stage; consultation with the target company's management may be futile as they are unlikely to be in a position to control redundancies; and the maximum penalty for failing to initiate consultations is a fine of £500. This is unlikely to act as an adequate deterrent.
In any case, the employer is offered a possibility-of mitigating this penalty by pleading 'substantial reasons related to his business which made it impracticable for him to comply with his obligations'. The necessity of maintaining the confidentiality of certain information may provide such an excuse.
The European Works Councils directive
The Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 implements in Ireland the European Works Councils directive (Directive 94/95, OJ 1994 L254/64) . The directive requires the establishment of European Works Councils in large enterprises operating across two or more ELI countries. It also provides for the establishment of special negotiating bodies comprising representatives from the undertakings' operations in the countries concerned. The objective of the directive is to ensure that undertakings operating in more than one EU country inform and consult representatives of employees affected by their decisions. Although there is no specific reference to takeovers, decisions on the future prospects of the business could obviously be categorised as decisions affecting employees. Apart from the limited application of this act to employees in general, other difficulties would stem from the confidential nature of the information to be disclosed and the fact that, while the act ensures that employees are informed of major changes in employment, their ability to affect the decisions being made would seem slight. This means that the employees cannot themselves enforce this duty. The company alone is the correct plaintiff in any action.
COMPANIES LEGISLATION

COMMON LAW
The power of directors to consider the interests of their employees is severely limited at common law. In Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883), Bowen EJ clearly stated that 'there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company'. Unless there is a specific object in the company's constitution sanctioning relevant non-commercial activities, it is necessary to establish that the activities are reasonably incidental or conducive to the carrying out of the company's business.
Another limiting factor is that a director, in order to fulfil his or her fiduciary duty, must believe that the costs of non-commercial 
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that implementing the
provisions of the draft 13th directive safeguarding the rights of employees in Ireland would require further legislative change. It would also require a change in the current acceptance of the domination of the interests of shareholders in corporate decision making. Whether such a change is desirable remains to be determined.
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